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Negotiations with a Rogue 
U.S. - Iran Nonproliferation Engagement 
By Brigitta Sanchez-O’Brien 
 
Introduction: Nonproliferation in Iran  
 The end of World War II marked a decades-long race towards the modernization of 
superpowers, culminating in the threat of nuclear warfare at the height of the Cold War. Tensions 
between global powers sped the world into a new era of negotiating a stop to nuclear 
proliferation, and in many instances, attempting to remove the possibility of nuclear weapons 
altogether. Mounting extremism and the threat of terrorism in recent decades has fueled this 
effort further, catalyzing U.S. nonproliferation negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Iran 
concurrently. While attempted talks aggravated existing animosity, they also spurred harsher 
sanctions internationally. The latter of which produced enough global pressure to successfully 
negotiate confines on Iran’s nuclear program. In an unprecedented display of diplomacy, the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed in 2015 by Iran, the European Union, 
and the UN Security Council’s five permanent members—China, Russia, UK, France, and the 
United States—and Germany (the P5+1). However, the Iran Nuclear Deal began its collapse 
three years later when President Donald Trump pulled the U.S. out of the JCPOA.  
 Though interactions have fluctuated, U.S.-Iranian relations remain hostile, intensified by 
Iranian outrage at Washington’s decision to pull out of the deal and reinstate sanctions. Iran’s 
Supreme Leader initially promised future retaliation and has subsequently violated the JCPOA 
with increasing boldness. The U.S. maximum pressure campaign is again targeting the Iranian 
economy, and with no deal in place, much of the world is left wondering what Iran would be 
capable of with a nuclear weapon. Diplomacy has worn thin and peace remains elusive as calls 
for renewed negotiations have been across the globe—without avail. Now is the time to return to 
the basic question asked when U.S.-Iranian talks first commenced decades ago: is alternative 
dispute resolution a legitimate means for settling this conflict? Despite Iran’s rogue history with 
the U.S., and notwithstanding escalating pressures both internal and external to Iran, the answer 
is yes. Negotiation is possible, but only under very particular circumstances moving forward. 
This paper will provide proof for why this is the case and outline a forward-looking negotiation 
strategy for settling the Iran-nuclear issue.
 
 
U.S. Relations with A Rogue Iran  
 U.S.-Iranian relations were largely nonexistent until covert U.S.-led operations organized 
a coup in 1953, in Iran, to overthrow democratically elected Mohammed Mossadeq. This came 
in response to global oil supply concerns after Mossadeq’s nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company just a few years prior. With the insurrection complete, U.S.-backed Mohammed 
Reza Pahlevi, Shah of Iran, officially established U.S.-Iranian relations. This formal commitment 
provided the Shah economic and military support from the U.S. in exchange for Western-centric 
policies which were highly controversial amongst the people of Iran. 
It was under Pahlevi’s rule in 1957 that Iran began their nuclear development. Iran’s 
foundational nuclear capabilities came as a result of the U.S. Atoms for Peace program—
originally created as a bargaining tool for long term non-proliferation with allies. The U.S. would 
provide “research reactors, fuel and scientific training to developing countries wanting civilian 
nuclear programs”1 in exchange for the developing country’s cooperation to use those nuclear 
programs solely for energy and research purposes. Under the Shah, Iran became a charter 
member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968—even before more prominent 
global players such as France and China joined.2 U.S.-Iranian relations were at their strongest 
under Pahlevi, and many in the U.S. considered Iran a principal ally; a sentiment that was not 
reciprocated by a considerable amount of the Iranian people and religious rulers. As American 
influence within Iran grew more prominent, U.S.-Iran relations became viewed as increasingly 
unacceptable by the Iranian public. Unrest evolved into revolution in 1979, led by religious 
leader Ayatollah Khomeini. The Shah sought asylum in the States, and Iran opened its theocratic 
rule with an attack on the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking sixty Americans hostage in a cardinal 
display of rogue behavior towards the United States.  
 After the 1979 Revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran established its authoritarian rule 
marked by violence and human rights abuses, silencing all opposition at home and abroad. Iran 
also began their support of international terrorism, funding the creation and maintenance of 
Hezbollah, the Lebanese terrorist organization Iran continues to utilize for their own foreign 
policy purposes. During the late 1980s and 1990s, Iran shunned negotiations with the U.S. 
concerning their nuclear programs, and pursued both public and hidden relations with Pakistan, 
China, and eventually Russia to complete development instead. Considering Iran’s use of 
terrorism to silence opposition and continued efforts towards nuclear proliferation, Iran 
comfortably ranks itself amongst the host of “pariah states”3 political scientists have observed 
since the 1970s. Many of which were later termed “rogue.” This was done in an effort to classify 
extremist regimes ideologically divorced from dominant western philosophy. This classification 
is one means by which political scientists have sought to influence and educate current and 
future diplomatic interactions with “rogues.”  
Former Pentagon official Michael Rubin points to Iran’s utilization of diplomacy as 
influenced by their rogue behavior: “For the ayatollahs, diplomacy is a tactic to divide the 
international community, pocket concessions, and hold off sanctions or military strikes.”4 
 
1 Sixty Years of “Atoms for Peace” and Iran’s Nuclear Program, The Brookings Institute, 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/12/18/sixty-years-of-atoms-for-peace-and-irans-nuclear-program/ 
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Because of Iran’s indulgent support of terrorism, the U.S. approached Iran with great caution, 
oftentimes offering more leeway and higher tolerance for Iranian officials than they otherwise 
might have—evidenced by a long history of Western accommodation in the face of Iranian 
defiance. Daniel L. Byman, Senior Fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings 
Institution, explains this response: “Washington recognizes that if it pushes Iran’s leaders, they 
can push back. Terrorism thus complicates U.S. planning for stopping Iran’s nuclear program 
and other top priorities.”5 This hesitation to push too hard coupled with unfailing abandonment 
of diplomacy led the U.S. to historically attempt peace talks at almost all costs, instead of 
exercising stricter engagement policies to hold the Iranian regime accountable for their 
statements and actions. Iran has spurned negotiations with the U.S. since the hostage crisis 
during the Carter administration, and this pattern has continued through subsequent presidential 
administrations. In response to Iran’s unpredictable interactions, the U.S. pivoted its focus to 
expanding sanctions, simultaneously pressuring China and Russia to minimize their 
collaboration with the rogue state as well, especially their support for Iran’s nuclear program.  
 During President George W. Bush’s incumbency in 2002, the National Council of 
Resistance of Iran (NCRI) came forward with the information that Iran was operating two 
nuclear facilities which were previously undisclosed. When the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) inspected the facilities under stipulations of Iran’s NPT agreement, the IAEA 
“found traces of enriched uranium hexafluoride in the centrifuges, indicating that the centrifuges 
had been used to enrich uranium [a necessary component for the assembly of a nuclear weapon], 
which violated Iran’s Safeguard Agreement with the IAEA.”6 Expert of Middle Eastern affairs, 
Kenneth M. Pollack, points to this violation of Iran’s safeguard agreement as one of the first of 
several red flags that have since led the U.S. and other nations to question whether Iran is truly 
interested in a nuclear program solely for peaceful purposes as they have continually claimed. 
Not only have they backed and funded various terrorist organizations and attacks, they have 
begun pursuing components of a nuclear weapon. Iran was found to have imported large 
quantities of Chinese hydrogen hexafluoride and acquired unreported centrifuges, technology, 
and research from Pakistan. Moreover, Iran successfully kept the use of centrifuges undisclosed 
from the rest of the world. Concerns have developed regarding Iran’s unpredictable and violent 
behavior. Many nations are fearful as to what Iran would do if a nuclear option became available 
to them, especially in an already tense Middle Eastern region. Despite terrorist sympathies, 
Pollack says the world should not necessarily be concerned that Iran would arm terrorists with 
nuclear weapons. He also speculates that, despite it being a major concern, “the least likely 
scenario is that Iran would acquire nuclear weapons and use them immediately against Israel. 
The same goes for Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and any other neighbor or adversary of Iran.”7 Pollack 
argues that Iran is aware that attacking a U.S. ally could mean their complete destruction as a 
result of U.S. retaliation. Even so, Iran’s history of unpredictable and at times seemingly 
irrational behavior, including support of jihad, leaves open the possibility that they may use a 
weapon if acquired.  
Additionally, proliferation leads to more proliferation. Iran is deeply committed to 
hegemonic pursuits in one of the most destabilized regions in the world.8 Scaling the conflict to a 
 
5 Byman, Daniel L.,"Proxy Power: Understanding Iran's Use of Terrorism." Brookings Institute. July 28, 2016. 
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race for nuclear weapons could prove to be the greatest mistake in Middle Eastern affairs to date. 
“We have made it very clear that if Iran acquires a nuclear capability, we'll do everything we can 
to do the same,”9 Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir from Saudi Arabia told CNN. Keeping even 
the possibility of a nuclear weapon out of Iran as it currently stands is both of U.S. and global 
security interests. Iran’s propensity to take risks has varied over the years, but they have 
demonstrated a recurring hostility globally.  Acquiring a nuclear weapon would amplify the 
threat Iran already poses to the rest of the world.  What moderates Iran’s behavior from rivaling a 
more horrific level of destruction, similar to Hitler’s Germany, is the limited means at the 
regime’s disposal for advancing specific extremist ideologies.  
 Recognizing Iran as a threat to global security, the U.S. imposed stricter executive orders 
and congressional sanctions. Various UN Security Council Resolutions have also worked 
towards the same end and the Iranian economy suffered severely as a result. “The EU prohibition 
on purchasing Iranian oil—coupled with American and European efforts to convince China, 
India, Japan, South Korea, and other countries to reduce their own imports of Iranian oil” was 
largely successful, reducing Iranian oil exports by more than half from 2011 to 2012.10 However, 
this was also accompanied by unemployment rising to 36%, inflation peaking at 50%, and prices 
swelling 87-112%.11 With pressures high on the Iranian government to do something about their 
economic situation, Iran signed the Joint Plan of Action in 2013. After years of economic 
deterioration, Iran’s negotiation efforts with France, Germany, and the U.K in the early 2000s 
expanded to include the U.S., Russia, China, and the EU. The Security Council’s P5+1 and the 
EU began a two-year process of peace talks with Iran towards what was later termed the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or The Iran Nuclear Deal. Talks commenced on the 
condition that Iran would temporarily roll back certain aspects of its nuclear program 
development in exchange for a reduction in economic sanctions. This was the first global effort 
to resolve the threat of a nuclear Iran, as well as the first formal U.S.-Iranian agreement after 
failed diplomatic attempts since 1979. An achievement then Secretary of State, John Kerry, 
credited to the work of global sanctions.12 The terms agreed to under the JCPOA were 
incremental in design, and would not be fully realized until Termination Day in October 2025, 
the tenth year anniversary of the plan’s adoption.13 The deal was created to restrict—but not 
end—Iranian nuclear development. Many restrictions would ease up in the last few years of the 
deal as well, further coinciding with removal of U.N., U.S., and EU sanctions. In a sign of 
reassurance, Iran agreed to regular inspections by the IAEA throughout. 
 The U.S. entered into the JCPOA under the Obama administration—a decision that 
sparked a considerable amount of domestic controversy. Iran’s human rights abuses had been left 
unaddressed and their support of terrorism was unaltered. However, President Obama steadfastly 
defended his participation in the JCPOA talks, arguing, “A nuclear-armed Iran is far more 
dangerous to Israel, to America, and to the world than an Iran that benefits from sanctions 
 
9 "Iran Warns Trump: 'You've Made a Mistake' over Nuclear Deal." BBC News. May 09, 2018. Accessed April 18, 
2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-44057306 
10 Pollack, Kenneth M. Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy. 133 
11 Pollack, Kenneth M. Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy. 133 
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Geneva-talks.html 
13 "Fact Sheets & Briefs." The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a Glance | Arms Control 
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relief.”14 He believed that slowing their nuclear development would bring stability at the close of 
the deal’s fifteen-year mark, and that if Iran were willing to accept the deal, the U.S. should be 
committed to accept it as well. He went so far as to analogize his engagement with Iran to that of 
President Nixon’s break-through with China in 1972. Springing on already fraying Soviet Union-
Chinese relations, Nixon reached out to China in its isolation and began what he saw as a long 
transformative campaign. “The world cannot be safe until China changes. Thus, our aim, to the 
extent that we can influence events, should be to induce change. The way to do this is to 
persuade China that it must change: that it cannot satisfy its imperial ambitions.”15 Iranian-
American policy analyst Karim Sadjadpour commented on Nixon’s success, crediting it to the 
fact that “…Mao had made a fundamental decision about his strategic shift, and he opened 
relations with the United States after concluding that the Soviet Union was a fundamental 
challenge to both of them.”16 Despite Obama’s claimed comparison, no such strategic shift ever 
came from the Iranian government and certainly not from their Supreme Leader. In fact, Iran has 
been openly hostile towards the U.S. since its revolution in 1979, with a very vocal “Death to 
America” rhetoric exemplifying the leading, albeit extreme, Iranian sentiment. Ayatollah 
Khamenei, for the first time in all the years of employing the use of that rhetoric, clarified last 
year that it was in reference to American leaders—not the American people. However, regardless 
of how far-reaching the sentiment is intended, this is one such display of fundamental ideologies 
at odds with successful negotiations between Iran and the U.S. Iran sat down to talk and 
eventually signed into the JCPOA due to economic and domestic pressure caused by the harsh 
effects of international sanctions. However, this “buying in” never came with a change in rogue 
behavior. There was never a shift in the nation’s domestic discourse on the JCPOA, let alone any 
on the acceptance of friendly relations with the United States. Perhaps longer-term change could 
have come as a result of Obama’s engagement and implementation of the deal. It is hard to make 
that argument, however, given the interruption of implementation when the U.S. departed from 
the JCPOA in 2018. 
 
Negotiation with Iran & JCPOA Opposition 
 From the early days on his campaign trail, President Trump openly opposed the Iran 
Nuclear Deal. He continuously reminded Americans of Iran’s ballistic missile launches in 
violation of the JCPOA and argued that the deal in no way mitigated Iran’s ability to build a 
nuclear weapon, it merely delayed the possibility. He spoke of leaving the JCPOA on multiple 
occasions and was reluctant to renew the U.S. commitment as stipulated under the deal. Finally, 
Trump gave the European allies an ultimatum of 120 days to renegotiate the deal to fix the 
glaring flaws he found within it, or else he would pull the U.S. from the agreement. On May 8, 
2018 President Trump announced an official departure, saying it would make America safer, and 
by November 2018, U.S. sanctions on Iran were reinstated and expanded. 
 A year prior to the U.S.’s departure from the Iran Nuclear Deal, Iran launched its first 
missile test since Trump had come into office, sparking renewed controversy over the breach of a 
Security Council resolution. The resolution in reference came at the close of the JCPOA and 
 
14 "Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal." National Archives and Records Administration. Accessed 
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stipulated that all activity relating to ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear weapon was 
impermissible, including launches of such missiles. According to a New York Times article 
published at the time, Iran purportedly said that the lack of a nuclear weapons program 
simultaneously implied the lack of missile design to carry any such weapon.17 This was more of 
a loophole than legitimate explanation in the eyes of President Trump who viewed Iran’s 
continued launches as a sign of defiance. A larger cause for abandoning the JCPOA, however, 
came in Trump’s support of a larger crowd of American opposition, the camp shared by former 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. A Wall Street Journal published an op-ed written by 
Kissinger and George Shultz in 2013 where both point to the drawn-out nature of the JCPOA to 
have been to its discredit. The deal was signed after nearly a decade of negotiations and the time 
span of those talks played out in favor of the Iranian government. Negotiations became for the 
sake of saving negotiations in the face of Iranian obstinance to a deal. Kissinger and Shultz 
commented on the JCPOA negotiations saying, “If the ruling group in Iran is genuinely prepared 
to enter into cooperative relations with the United States and the rest of the world, the U.S. 
should welcome and encourage that shift. But progress should be judged by a change of 
program, not of tone.”18 The fact that the JCPOA settled on pausing Iran’s nuclear program as 
opposed to shutting it down, or even dismantling significant parts of it, explains not only who 
wielded more leverage during the JCPOA negotiations, but who maintains that leverage today. 
Iran, unwilling to concede more than oversight and some delay for their program, came out on 
top, maintaining most benefits from before negotiations, as well as acquiring sanctions relief and 
revenue linked to several lifted sanctions. Revenue Iran was free to spend in whatever way they 
wished—on public or clandestine investments. This is the fuller context of the rationale that led 
President Trump to walk away from the JCPOA. In terms of stopping Iran from acquiring 
nuclear weapons, alone, it was decidedly a bad deal.  
In his book On Compromise and Rotten Compromise, Professor Avishi Margalit outlines 
two categorically illegitimate compromises, the first in relation to the content of the deal, and the 
second in relation to whom the deal is attempted with. Margalit says some actions are too 
reprehensible to compromise on. And some deals may ask one to negotiate with someone who is 
so far below one’s threshold of reason and shared principles that any kind of compromise is 
hardly possible and morally unjustifiable. It could be argued that Iran is one such relation given 
their commitment to hegemony in the Middle East and the terrorism that accompanies that level 
of commitment. Their identity as a rogue regime makes interaction, especially in the way of 
diplomatic relations, very unadvisable without significant signs of reassurance to a commitment 
to peace. This draws attention to content; the JCPOA was negotiated to allow Iran to operate 
their nuclear facilities in a peaceful manner, minimizing their production abilities and limiting 
expansionary efforts. Before the JCPOA, “Tehran would have needed two to three months to 
produce enough weapons-grade HEU for a nuclear weapon.”19 After the JCPOA, that breakout 
time was stretched to a year. Since Iran has broken further away from JCPOA restrictions, an 
IAEA report from November 2019 reported Iran’s breakout time is now somewhere between 6-
 
17 Sanger, David E. "Iran Launches a Missile, Testing Trump's Vows of Strict Enforcement." The New York Times. 
January 30, 2017. Accessed April 18, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/world/middleeast/iran-missile-
test.html?_r=0&module=inline 
18 Kissinger, Henry A., and George P. Shultz. "Kissinger and Shultz: What a Final Iran Deal Must Do." The Wall 
Street Journal. December 02, 2013. Accessed April 18, 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-a-final-iran-deal-
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10 months.20 This is in the event Iran would attempt assembling a nuclear weapon— a weapon in 
violation of their NPT agreement.  
Opponents to the JCPOA call the deal a “rotten compromise” because there were no 
long-term reassurances made by Iran to guarantee they would not pursue a nuclear weapon. 
Though Iran continually said their plants were for civilian use only, this is a hard claim to 
reconcile with the approach they have taken for nuclear development thus far. Not only are the 
Iranian nuclear facilities much larger than necessary to support a civilian program, but their past 
behavior has shown they consistently diverted resources away from their singular civilian 
nuclear power plant to build uranium enrichment programs instead, something Pollack says is 
indicative of a military, not a civilian program. Additionally, he adds, “Iran sits on the second-
largest natural gas reserves in the world. Natural gas is cheaper and an easier method of 
generating power than nuclear.”21 Despite this insight into Iran’s past nuclear pursuits, the U.S. 
moved forward with the JCPOA which lessens the Iranian program’s output, but in no way 
reduces its potential. This is a major deficiency on Washington’s part, though there is no moral 
breach here that necessarily would constitute a rotten deal, at least not in terms of substance. It 
did, however, severely undermine what many put forth as the real American bottom line on the 
Iranian-nuclear issue: to ensure no room for Iran to acquire a weapon.  
 At the height of the Cold War standoff in 1986, President Ronald Reagan met Mikhail 
Gorbachev at a summit in Reykjavik to negotiate peace between the U.S. and Soviet Russia. The 
talks primarily consisted of arms control which included a ban that would end development of 
the U.S.’s budding Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the first outer space anti-ballistic defense 
effort. Reagan refused to include banning R&D on the SDI program, identifying this line of 
defense as his non-negotiable bottom line. Gorbachev, suspicious of Reagan’s commitment to 
the SDI and fearing the advantage it would provide the U.S. against the Soviet Union, insisted 
that it be given up in exchange for an end to the nuclear standoff. In what was considered one of 
the most shocking moments of the Cold War, President Reagan walked away from the deal. He 
wanted an end to the war, but not at the cost of compromising what he saw as America’s best 
interest. In walking away, however, he opened the door for later talks in 1987 where, after 
mounting Soviet economic pressures, Gorbachev dropped the issue and signed the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a vastly better negotiation in the eyes of the United States.  
 Some compare Trump’s departure from the Iran Nuclear Deal to Reagan’s walking out 
on the Reykjavik Summit. Trump’s bottom line is that he wants real concessions from Iran to 
ensure that whatever civilian nuclear program they will pursue will be downsized, or at the very 
least, dismantled in part. He wants a better, lasting deal, one that does not expire after fifteen 
years, and one which provides more long-term security against Iran’s nuclear development.22 
That was Trump’s bottom line, one that he was willing to walk away over. The trouble with the 
comparison, however, is that Reagan walked away from a proposed deal, while President Trump 
walked away from a deal already in place, causing international alarm for the reliability of U.S. 
involvement moving forward. President Trump acted on his bottom line, but walking away from 
an established deal did not give him any of the advantages it would have potentially given 
 
20 Albright, David, and Stricker, Andrea, IAEA Iran Safeguards Report Analysis: Iran Commits Multiple Violations 
of The Nuclear Deal, Several Non-Reversible, November 13, 2019, Research Memo 
21 Pollack, Kenneth M. Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy. 41 
22 Maloney, Suzanne. “Trump Wants a Bigger, Better Deal with Iran. What Does Tehran Want?" Brookings. August 




President Obama had he been the U.S. president to walk away and wait for sanctions to pressure 
Iran into conceding more. 
 
Negotiation Proposal 
 The U.S. has remained outside of the JCPOA, and despite Iran’s promised future 
retaliation, President Trump has stuck by his decision. Under the Trump administration, America 
has maintained its maximum pressure campaign by expanding sanctions, declaring the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organization,23 and most recently targeting IRGC’s 
General Qasem Soleimani. Despite tensions, however, alternative dispute resolution remains a 
feasible option for resolving U.S.-Iranian differences. Though not in the manner previously 
pursued under Obama’s appeasement, nor in the manner in which President Trump has continued 
to pursue his own all-encompassing deal with Iran. Instead, if peace talks with Iran are to be both 
successful and effective, they must be pursued under a new framework. One informed by 
previous mistakes—built on checks and assurances. 
Historically, the U.S. has been unable to trust Iran at their word. Moving forward, talks 
will lack credibility if Iran does not provide outwards signs of good faith and proof of 
cooperation by way of actions mirroring their rhetoric and vice versa. Simultaneously, the U.S. 
ought to abide by the same principle. Creating red lines, formalizing boundaries, and actually 
holding Iran accountable to those boundaries will be vital towards establishing legitimacy of 
intentions and action. If Iran begins to skirt boundaries or publicly denounces the U.S. during 
peace talks, the U.S. and allies must abide by their own terms and reimpose relevant sanctions. 
Otherwise diplomacy is undermined and talks for peace will accomplish little beyond making 
headlines. Negotiation between the U.S. and Iran is possible, but only within firm checks on the 
process and under new leadership. President Trump has increasingly isolated the U.S. from 
several global powers, and antagonized Khamenei to a point where the Supreme Leader has 
publicly renounced any chance of negotiations with President Trump and his administration. The 
reality of the matter is that talks will not progress forward in a meaningful nor productive way 
under current Iranian and U.S. leadership. In light of this political climate, the following 
negotiation proposal is made with President Trump’s successor in mind. 
 Because Iran is a rogue regime, it is best to pursue negotiations through a collective 
global endeavor. The P5+ Germany and the EU, as in the case of the JCPOA, is the kind of 
negotiation effort the U.S. would need to pursue because their combined pressure alone creates 
enough leverage to negotiate with Iran. Moreover, their collective power is capable of ensuring 
terms of the deal are enforced. Washington’s collaboration with the rest of the world to establish 
an alliance with unified interests is the first task in a forward-looking strategy to address Iran’s 
nuclear activity.  
 Iran has prioritized sanctions relief and retaining their right as a sovereign nation to 
develop a nuclear program. Acknowledging that the U.S. in no longer a member of the JCPOA, 
let us assume President Trump’s successor also wants to clarify the textual ballistic missile 
stipulations within the JCPOA, and “fix” other sections of the deal to reduce the chance of Iran 
building a nuclear weapon in the long run. If this assumption were true, the best solution for 
meeting both these interests would be to further negotiate, as opposed to renegotiate or dissolve 
the JCPOA. 
 
23 Wong, Edward, and Eric Schmitt. "Trump Designates Iran's Revolutionary Guard a Foreign Terrorist 




 As mentioned earlier, the U.S. would need to prioritize talking to relevant global powers 
in the JCPOA. The nature of these talks, rather compromises, would determine if and how talks 
with Iran could commence. If global powers are unwilling to sanction Iran to a point where some 
agreement can be reached, then talks with Iran are off the table altogether. As previously 
presented, there is no leverage unless the international community is a united front. If only a few, 
or, worst case scenario, none at all want to be part of further negotiations with the U.S. and Iran, 
then the U.S. is left with a short list of options for engagement with Iran. Diplomatic talks is not 
one of them. If, however, the international community agrees to work with the U.S. in returning 
to the framework of the JCPOA, and if sanctions utilized for bringing Iran back to that 
framework can be agreed to, then the international community, collectively, can move towards 
further negotiations with Iran. Entering back into the JCPOA is in the U.S.’s best interest in 
order to have a say in negotiating Iran’s nuclear program. It would also benefit the rest of the 
global powers in the lifting of U.S. sanctions, and the threat of tariffs and secondary sanctions. If 
the P5, Germany, and the EU agreed to an arrangement leading to further negotiation, Iran would 
be compelled to cooperate, or suffer all pre-JCPOA reinstated. It is in Iran’s best interest for all 
post-breaking-of-the-JCPOA sanctions to be lifted, and for the maximum pressure campaign to 
ease. Furthermore, the U.S. could work towards a bipartisan plan that could win over 
Congressional support, offering further reassurance to Iran, and gaining broader international 
buy-in. In order for any of these assurances to be offered by the U.S., however, Iran must also be 
willing to do the same. Because they have not remained in accordance with JCPOA standards, 
Iran, in a display of good faith, would need to return to the deal. An IAEA inspection could 
verify such a return and should be used as a precondition for resuming talks with Iran. 
 While a complete nuclear program shut down would not be acceptable to Iran, the U.S. 
could offer a nearly complete removal of sanctions and increased trade agreements in exchange 
for Iran to dismantle their nuclear program to civilian size, and remove all stored centrifuges 
already not allowed operable under the JCPOA terms. A ballistic missile clarification ought to be 
pursued next, where limitation or elimination of launches could serve as proof that Iran is 
sincerely interested in peacefully building up their nation and not trying to exert military force to 
achieve greater hegemony in the region. In addition to abiding by this term of the agreement, the 
U.S. ought to lead the other global powers to explicitly acknowledge all UN Resolutions 
applicable to Iran as red lines and inform Iran that a breach of any would result in a snapback of 
sanctions. It is imperative that both the U.S. and other global powers follow through with these, 
or whatever boundaries would be drawn up. Especially given Iran’s history of testing the limits 
of U.S. terms and willingness to enforce red lines. A failure to meet either would undermine all 
negotiations and whatever deal is able to be reached in the end.  
 In line with U.S. interests for the future of non-proliferation efforts, this deal ought to be 
negotiated as a long-term plan. Proposed as a deal that would be revisited, not completed, in 
another twenty years in addition to the initial fifteen, with IAEA inspections throughout. This 
would be a deal of containment, made with the acknowledgement that so long as the Iranian 
regime established under fundamentalist ideologies in 1979 remained in power, Iran could not be 
left completely alone to expand their nuclear program.  
While hardliners still largely run the government in Iran, their younger generations have 
displayed increasing opposition to the Ayatollah’s management, beginning primarily in 2009, but 
reviving and increasing further in 2017. The people of Iran ought to be remembered amidst these 
talks—they are the ones who suffer from international sanctions. At the same time, however, 
growing anxiety over these sanctions is what has motivated them to pressure their government 
 
 
into more substantial cooperation with the West. Given this current internal climate in Iran, the 
hope for this deal of containment is twofold. Firstly, if the regime wants to remain in power, they 
need to abide by their deals with the West so as to keep their people from overthrowing the 1979 
regime. And secondly, pursuing long-term containment increases the chances that Iran may 
eventually experience an internal transformation, which, without any Western involvement, 
could be a very good thing both for the Iranian people and the rest of the world. As mentioned 
previously, it is Iran’s regime that poses the biggest threat and not necessarily an advanced 
nuclear program in and of itself. In the event that a more moderate rule of ideology was to 
govern Iran, the U.S. and global powers could reassess the deal, asking whether Iran could be 
trusted to act as a stable member of the international community.  
 Of course, these conclusions are predicated on the assumption that Iran will heed 
international sanctions and return to the deal and sit through further negotiations. Iran may refuse 
any or all of those steps of negotiation, and instead settle to independently seek covert nuclear 
aid from Russia as they did in the past.24 This would certainly be extreme behavior on their part, 
which, though not unusual for Iran, is very unlikely given their domestic pressures to save their 
economy. In the event that they did refuse further negotiation, the U.S. ought to draw allies away 
from a broken JCPOA altogether. And in place of an agreement and to the degree progress is 
discernible from IAEA inspections and gathered intelligence, the U.S. ought to consider other 
means of preventing Iran from assembling a nuclear weapon. With the collaboration of the 
international community wherever possible. Force, though a highly unfavorable choice to say the 
least, is one extreme measure that ought to be considered in a worst-case scenario where and if it 
is concluded Iran is assembling nuclear weapon. Negotiations are not always successful. Neither 
are they always an appropriate response to resolving particular conflicts. More extreme 
responses outside of diplomacy and alternative dispute resolution are rarely politically popular, 
which is why they are historically adopted as a last resort. In the event an agreement is not 
reached, and Iran continued to build a nuclear program, the U.S. would be tasked with weighing 
the tradeoffs of continuing to pursue “peace talks” or looking to other means of preventing a 
nuclear Iran. 
 
Conclusion: Containment Working Towards Peace  
 As long as Iran displays rogue behavior in upholding the ideology of their regime, 
nuclear nonproliferation remains a principal concern for U.S. and global security. While 
alternative dispute resolution methods have had mixed results in the past, there is a good chance 
of their success under new leadership and defined boundaries. If guided appropriately by the 
necessary pressures, negotiations could produce a plan of containment that may very well 
provide a suitable answer to a nuclear Iran. Moreover, younger Iranian generations have begun to 
openly resent the ideology which fueled the 1979 Revolution. Protests and growing cohesiveness 
amongst the people of Iran has begun what appears to be a gradual shift towards reforming to a 
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